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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout her Reply Brief Hedrick characterizes the proceedings as one to 
establish paternity (Appellant's Reply, p. 9, L. 21), or non-paternity. This 
characterization fails to account for the fact that a legal finding of paternity had already 
occurred. A finding of paternity under LC. §7-1106(1) is significant and confers rights 
upon the parties and the child, including inheritances. That in extreme measures such as 
fraud, duress or material mistake the finding can be overturned does not make it 
insignificant, or as Hedrick refers to it, "fictional" (Appellant's Reply p. 14, L. 11). 
Hedrick's characterization of the factual basis for her Motion to Dismiss is also 
misleading as it is impossible for Hedrick to have truly been mistaken about the identity 
of the father. While judicial notice of the Pre Trial Memorandum submitted by Hedrick 
in the guardianship proceedings was not requested, Gordon alleged in his Verified 
Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(8) that Hedrick had claimed to 
be pregnant before meeting Gordon, citing the Pre Trial Memorandum (R. p 60-61 and p. 
90). Hedrick has yet to allege in any affidavit or verified pleadings in these proceedings 
that she actually reasonably thought or had any reason to believe that Gordon was the 
more likely biological father. Further, even if Hedrick did not know for certain Gordon 
was not the biological father of the child, it does not change the fact, as logically 
concluded by the District Court, either Hedrick knew Gordon was not the father, or knew 
he was one of two possibilities and was indifferent to the truth. Either conclusion makes 
it impossible to characterize her actions as a "mistake" to invalidate the legal finding of 
paternity. 
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CROSS APPEAL REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. Gordon Should not be Punished for any Perceived Failure to 
Properly Respond to a Motion Made Under the Wrong 
I.R.C.P., that Cited no Basis in Law for the Relief Requested, 
that Failed to State any of the Elements Required by Statute 
for Bringing about the Relief Requested, and gave him 
Inadequate Time to Respond. 
The Motion to Dismiss that is central to this case gave very little clue as to how or 
under what law it was seeking to do what essentially amounted to a termination of 
parental rights. No citation was made in the Motion to Dismiss to Idaho Code§ 16-2005 
or to Idaho Code§ 7-1106. No relevant evidence was submitted to support claims under 
either of those two statutes. If Hedrick was aware of the requirements of LC. § 16-2005 
or LC. § 7-1106(2) she should have cited it and stated how each element was met, if she 
was not then she cannot expect to file a vague motion to dismiss and expect Gordon to 
fill in the blanks. Even so, Hedrick maintains that Gordon should have somehow made 
the proper objections and legal arguments in front of the magistrate before his Motion for 
Relief from Judgment despite being shortchanged on time to respond. Any argument that 
the Motion to Dismiss was simply granted based on a defect of Gordon's pleadings is 
invalidated by the Amended Pleading filed with the Court. It was not until a Motion for 
Relief from Judgment that the proper authority was identified for removal from the birth 
certificate (and done so by Gordon) and not until an appeal that the arguments were fully 
developed concerning that authority. This shows that indeed Gordon was surprised and 
prejudiced by Hedrick's failure to base her motion on applicable laws and with a factual 
basis that could meet that law and grant the relief requested. 
Hedrick cites several cases purporting to show that Gordon waived his objections 
by failing to present them, none of them involving a motion for summary judgment 
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pushed through a 12(b)(6) procedure. Because Hedrick's Motion to Dismiss failed to cite 
any law or outline the proper elements, it was impossible for Gordon to formulate the 
proper objections. Further, this Court has held previously that "when matters outside the 
pleading, in the form of affidavits, are presented to and considered by the court it is 
the duty of the court to treat such motion to dismiss as a motion for summary 
judgment." Boesiger v. De}.1odena, 88 Idaho 337 (1965); citing Rush v. G-K lvlachinery 
Co., 84 Idaho 10 (1961). 
That it is the duty of the Court to implement the proper procedure implies that the 
objection is not waived should the party fail to voice their objection in time. Applying 
this logic the Court of Appeals held in Hellickson v. Jenkins "Even if we had concluded 
that such issue had not been adequately raised by Hellicksons, there is a further reason for 
vacating . . . It is difficult for us to determine from the record before us whether the 
magistrate, in granting the motion to dismiss ... applied the Rule 12(b)(6) ... or applied the 
Rule 56" 118 Idaho 273, 277-78, (Ct. App. 1990). Failing to properly conve11 a 12(b)(6) 
motion into one for summary judgment may not completely pr.event an aggrieved party 
from being heard, but it does seriously hamper their ability to present a competent 
defense and results in the use of an improper standard. As previous decisions of this 
Court put an affirmative duty on the courts to convert a 12(b )( 6) motion to a motion for 
summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings are considered, and because an 
appellate court cannot determine whether or not the applicable standard was used, failure 
to treat such motion as one for summary judgment constitutes reason to vacate and 
remand for further proceedings whether or not a party is able to voice an articulate 
objection to the improper proceedings before being rushed through them. 
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B. The District Court Should have Awarded Gordon Attorney's 
Fees based on Hedrick's Motion that was not well Grounded in 
Fact or Warranted by Existing Law. 
As argued in Gordon's initial brief, Hedrick's Motion to Dismiss was not grounded in 
fact nor did it attempt to cite any existing law that would enable it to remove Gordon 
from the birth certificate. Because of this, Gordon has requested attorneys fees against 
Hedrick and her counsel under I.R.C.P. l l(a)(l). Not until Gordon himself identified LC. 
§ 7-1106(2) as at least a potential statute on which to base the relief Hedrick had 
requested did Hedrick respond with any mention of a material mistake or the applicable 
law. These arguments were not relevant to the Motion for Reconsideration as the Court 
had already terminated Gordon's parental rights under the original Motion to Dismiss. 
Only after appeal did Hedrick make arguments concerning the biological father of 
the child, revealing his identity in an appellate brief before this Court. Only in Gordon's 
Brief Supplement was mentioned the procedure found in Idaho Code § 16-2005 for 
termination of parental rights, which is essentially what Hedrick originally requested of 
the Magistrate. This is another example of Hedrick and her counsel leaving Gordon to 
fill in the blanks by guessing under what law Hedrick might have potentially sought relief 
and defending against it in advance. That such attempts are necessary demonstrates that 
Hedrick's Motion to Dismiss was not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. 
While Gordon concedes that the ultimate issue before this Court, that of statutory 
interpretation concerning the phrase "material mistake" in § 7-1106, is not a frivolous 
issue, Hedrick's insistence on jamming a square peg Motion to Dismiss into a round hole 
has increased attorney's fees for both parties and prohibited the arguments, both factual 
and legal, from being developed at the magistrate level. 
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Rather than seek to address and change the problematic motion and the incorrect 
proceedings, Hedrick continues to push the defective Motion to Dismiss all the way to 
this Court. She only now retroactively makes an attempt to attach the Motion to some 
existing law that potentially could have given her the relief requested. Had Hedrick 
simply re-filed the motion under I.R.C.P. 56, based it on the existing law of Idaho Code § 
7-1106, and at least made some attempt to conform the motion to the elements found in § 
7-1106 this issue could have been developed fully before arriving at the Supreme Court. 
Discovery requests, depositions, and summary judgment briefing could have established 
sufficient facts for the Magistrate to have fully examined the proper issues. The standard 
for awarding attorneys fees is not whether a party ultimately has or could have raised a 
legitimate issue, but where her position was "pursued frivolously." Sun Valley Shopping 
Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87 (1991) Even though Hedrick could have 
pursued her position in good faith she chose to cling to a motion with no basis in law, 
pushed through improper procedures, that fails to allege facts that can grant the relief 
requested. Therefore the District Court erred in not awarding Gordon attorney's fees. 
Hedrick also argues that Gordon has waived his right to attorney's fees before the 
Magistrate and District Courts. The Amended Petition filed with the Magistrate Court 
paragraph 13 lays out the applicable statutes and rules of civil procedure under which 
Gordon has requested attorneys fees (R. at 188). Admittedly an oversight in the 
compilation of the record has resulted in the non-inclusion of a supplemental brief filed 
with the District Court concerning attorney's fees. Should this Court allow Gordon to 
rectify that oversight it will possess sufficient documents in the record to rule on the 
issue. 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT I CROSS APPELANT'S REPLY BRIEF 5 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Respondent's Opening Brief, Gordon 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court's decision regarding custody 
and reverse the District Court's decision concerning attorney's fees. 
DATED THIS (7 day of February 2015 
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